The end of Da Noli and Vivaldi
On 5 September the Chief of the General Staff, General Vittorio Ambrosio, informed Admiral De Courten that the armistice would be announced between 10 and 15 September, probably 12 or 13 (the Italian government, in fact, hoped to to be able to postpone the announcement until that date), and that probably the fleet would have had to move to La Maddalena, in Sardinia, where perhaps the king, the royal family and part of the government would also have taken refuge. On the morning of September 6, Ambrosio confirmed to De Courten that, should it be impossible to maintain the government in Rome (a violent German reaction to the news of the armistice was more than predictable, and no plan had been drawn up - culpably - for the defense of the capital), the king and the leaders of the armed forces would have moved to La Maddalena, given that the clear superiority of the Italian forces in Sardinia (130,000 men, compared to 32,000 Germans) guaranteed that at least that island could be considered safe from the German reaction, unlike mainland Italy. He therefore asked De Courten to make two destroyers, two corvettes and two fast craft available to the royal family and the government for their transfer to Sardinia.
In the meantime, reports of movements of the Allied naval forces multiplied (culminating in the sighting, in the afternoon of 7 September, of a formation of Allied landing craft sailing towards the Gulf of Salerno), which suggested that the announcement of the armistice by the Allies would probably have taken place a few days earlier than expected, around 7 or 8 September.
Consequently, on the same 6 September Supermarina - by order of the head of government, Marshal Pietro Badoglio - prepared a plan for the transfer from Rome to La Maddalena of the king, of Badoglio, of the government (including the leaders of the armed forces) and of the entourage, altogether about fifty personalities. The choice of destroyers destined for the transfer of king and government fell on Da Noli and Vivaldi (who at that time was in Genoa to start a period of work), who formed the XVI Destroyer Squadron: Supermarina ordered the two units to be in Civitavecchia starting from the dawn of 9 September, ready to move in two hours. They should have embarked on kings and the government fleeing from Rome to take them to La Maddalena (obviously, the commanders had been generically talked about the embarkation of high personalities, without revealing their identity); for the same purpose, the corvettes Gabbiano and Pellicano (later reduced to the single corvette Pellicano, which would have embarked some of the high characters together with the two destroyers) had to be ready in Gaeta, and two fast motorboats had to be prepared at Fiumicino (they would have served to the plan prepared by Admiral De Courten, to bring king and followers up to Civitavecchia).
In the late afternoon / evening of 7 September, Supermarina ordered the Command of the Naval Forces from Battaglia to speed up the preparations for the departure of Da Noli and Vivaldi as much as possible, so that they would be in Civitavecchia no later than eight in the morning of the 9; that same evening, Supermarina sent the FF command. NN. BB. the message POPE (Absolute Precedence over Absolute Precedence) "Have CT VIVALDI and DA NOLI immediately move the wreck [Civitavecchia] and be ready in six hours (alt) PISA TABLE (alt) 194507".
At 16.20 on 8 September Supermarina sent an order, completed at 15.30, in which he ordered Da Noli and Vivaldi to sail from La Spezia and Genoa to arrive in Civitavecchia at eight the following day.
At 6 pm on 8 September the team admiral Carlo Bergamini, commander in chief of the naval battle forces, summoned all the admirals and commanders subordinate to him on the battleship Roma (moored in La Spezia with the rest of the team), his flagship present in La Spezia. Among those summoned there was also the frigate captain Pio Valdambrini, commander of the Da Noli.
The previous day, Bergamini had participated in Rome, at the headquarters of the Navy, in a meeting called by Admiral De Courten, who, while not revealing the armistice to anyone, had issued a series of instructions for the installations on land prepare to repel any German attacks and the ships prepare for the eventual transfer to ports outside the Italian peninsula.
To the admirals and commanders gathered on Rome, Bergamini announced that he could not report everything that De Courten had told him, but that very serious decisions by the government were imminent, and that only the Navy, among the Italian armed forces, could be considered still intact and tidy. In case of receipt of the conventional telegram «Implementing public order measures Memorandum n. 1 Supreme Command », the German personnel on board should have been captured for the connections and the special alarm should have been implemented, that is, to prepare the ships to repel any coup from the outside. It was also necessary to prepare for the eventuality of self-sinking.
During the meeting, Admiral Bergamini confirmed the order of departure for Civitavecchia to commander Valdambrini, who confirmed (through Admiral Luigi Biancheri, commander of the VIII Naval Division stationed in Genoa) also to the captain of the vessel Francesco Shirt. , commander of the Vivaldi and squadron leader of the XVI Destroyer Squadron.
Shortly after the conclusion of the meeting, around 6.30 pm, the Allies finally announced the armistice of Cassibile with a proclamation broadcast by Radio Algeri, and just over an hour later, at 7.42 pm, Marshal Badoglio confirmed the news with a statement sent from the EIAR.
The Da Noli sailed from La Spezia at 10pm, headed for Civitavecchia. At 11.15 pm of the same 8 September, off the island of Tino (just south of La Spezia), the Da Noli reunited with Vivaldi, coming from Genoa in conditions of reduced efficiency, following the latter, and together they continued to Civitavecchia.
In the meantime, however, German paratroopers of the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division had already been occupying Ostia and Fiumicino: this made it impossible to embark the king and government on motorboats to transport them to Civitavecchia. Consequently, the king and his followers abandoned the idea of reaching Sardinia and fell back on another alternative for the escape from Rome: instead of heading to Civitavecchia, they took the road to Pescara, from where they then reached Ortona, where they embarked on the corvette. Bayonet who led them to Brindisi.
The mission of Da Noli and Vivaldi therefore lost its purpose: consequently, at 6.40 am on 9 September, Supermarina ordered the two destroyers - who had already arrived in front of Civitavecchia - to reverse the route and return to La Spezia ("Invertite the route and return to La Spezia-064009 ", received at 7), except to correct at 7.24, ordering instead to change route and head immediately towards La Maddalena (" Change my previous order, immediately direct La Maddalena island-072409 ", order received at 7.43 ), where the bulk of the fleet from La Spezia and Genoa had to move, under the command of Admiral Bergamini.
At 10.38 Supermarina ordered Da Noli and Vivaldi to rejoin the rest of the battle squad ("24997 - CT Vivaldi and CT Da Noli reunite with Squadra-092309"), but immediately afterwards I will reiterate the order "Change my previous order, direct immediately La Maddalena island ", while at 14.14 he ordered that they pass west of Sardinia and head for Bona, joining, if possible, the battle team (" Vivaldi and Da Noli. Supermarina 97424-Continue to Bona, possibly joining the Battaglia Naval Force ( alt) Milan - 132909 ").
Meanwhile, the Vivaldi had intercepted a communication from the corvette Danaide to Supermarina, in which the ship reported that La Maddalena had been occupied by German forces.
Therefore, at 2.33 pm, the message from Supermarina - telecoded 87775 - which ordered Da Noli and Vivaldi to leave the Maddalena estuary to the west, and to sink all the German vehicles engaged in traffic between Sardinia and Corsica during the passage did not arouse any surprise. ("PAPA Cifr. 19 ter from Supermarina to Vivaldi et Da Noli pcRoma for FF.NN.BB. Exit from the estuary towards the west and sunk all the German vehicles carrying out the Sardinia-Corsica traffic alt Milan 134909"). Having deciphered this order, the two destroyers approached the Strait of Bonifacio; at 16 they met the Danaide and another corvette, the Minerva, sailing from La Maddalena to Portoferraio. The two corvettes confirmed that the Germans had occupied La Maddalena.
What had happened was that General Carl Hans Lungerhausen, commander of the 90th German Division stationed in Sardinia, had agreed with the military commander of the island, General Antonio Basso, the peaceful evacuation of his troops (32,000 men) to Corsica, through the port of La Maddalena. Colonel Hunäus (erroneously reported by Italian sources as "Uneus"), a subordinate of Lungerhausen, had in turn made arrangements with Admiral Bruno Brivonesi, maritime military commander of Sardinia, so that the passage of the German troops through La Maddalena would take place without acts of hostility (and in this sense, on the other hand, were the orders given by General Basso to Admiral Brivonesi); but at 11.25 on that 9 September Hunäus had betrayed the agreement he had made, carrying out a coup d'état with his troops and thus assuming control of several key positions within the perimeter of the base. The German troops had also surrounded the Marine Command of La Maddalena, placing Admiral Brivonesi under armed escort, practically a prisoner. With the port in their hands, the Germans had begun the ferrying of their troops and their equipment through the Strait of Bonifacio, by means of motor rafts and other similar means.
At 16.20, proceeding at 23 knots with three out of four boilers in operation, Da Noli and Vivaldi entered the Strait of Bonifacio, staying on the safety routes, with the men at the combat posts.
Shortly before passing Razzoli, two boats were sighted which, sailing in section, were heading towards Corsica. At 16.50, the distances reduced to 8-9 km, the Vivaldi opened fire with 120 mm guns against the two German vehicles, identified as a torpedo boat and a motor raft. After firing against the motor raft ceased after a few salvoes, given that the unit had reversed its course, appeared skidded and was smoking, the Vivaldi reopened fire at 5 pm against a torpedo boat and then against two motor rafts, visible under the Corsican coast; on board it was judged to have landed several hits on the rafts.
Even the Da Noli, which had not seen the first two units from the opposite side, now opened fire on the German units visible on the Corsican side. A lively fight developed.
The various sources report conflicting news on the outcome of this clash. The Vivaldi commander estimated some of the German patrol boats and motor rafts to have been sunk, others damaged and still others forced to repair on the coast. The volume "The Navy from 8 September 1943 to the end of the conflict", of the Historical Office of the Navy, reports that, as it turns out, no German units would have been hit, but only framed by the Italian shooting; but both the historian Francesco Mattesini, in his essay "The armistice of 8 September 1943 and the drama of the naval battle forces" published in the USMM Archives Bulletin, and the volume "Esploratori, frigate, corvette and Italian notices" also 'it of the USMM, report instead that some of the motor rafts were damaged and set on fire by the shooting of Vivaldi and Da Noli. The book "Struggle for the Middle Sea" by Vincent O'Hara, on the other hand, identifies the units hired by Da Noli and Vivaldi as an R-Boot-type motodragamine and three Marinefährprahm-type motor rafts, and states that the latter would have been forced to move to run aground on the coast by the shooting of Italian ships. The researcher Platon Alexiades, on the basis of German documents, discovered that among the units engaged by the Italian destroyers there were at least two motodragamines, the R 198 and the R 200 of the 11. Raumboot-Flottille, perhaps the "torpedo boats" indicated in the Vivaldi's report. Still on the basis of the German documentation consulted by him, there is no word of losses in relation to the clash in the Strait of Bonifacio, while the loss of seven units sunk that same day, not far away, by the torpedo boat Aliseo in Bastia is reported.
Meanwhile, several planes were spotted flying low along the Corsican coast, staying out of range of the destroyers' anti-aircraft guns.
The attack against the German units, in addition of course to the reaction of the latter, also caused a violent reaction by some 88 mm coastal batteries located on the southern coast of Corsica, whose control had passed to the German troops (their gunners, belonging to the black shirts, they had delivered that morning to German units of the 16th Flak-Division). Initially it was not possible to accurately locate the coastal batteries to be able to respond to fire.
The Vivaldi, which had increased the speed to 25 knots and had tried to keep off the coast (compatibly with the position of the mines), was hit by several hits around 5.15pm, suffering numerous losses among the crew and serious damage to the engine and part of the armament. At 17.30 the Vivaldi was immobilized, with fires on board and still under fire from one of the coastal batteries.
The situation of the Da Noli, which had also opened fire on the Corsican coastal batteries (as well as on the German naval vessels), was relatively better: although it too was reached by two shots fired from the coastal batteries (one hit it at stern, at the height of the waterline, and the other at the bow, under the castle), the destroyer had suffered neither deaths nor injuries among his crew, and the damage was much less serious than those reported by Vivaldi. After being hit, the Da Noli spread out from the coast and speeding past the Vivaldi on the left and southwest, emitting a lot of smoke, to get out of range with respect to the coastal batteries. On board, the crew set to work to plug the waterway opened by the cannon fire that had hit the ship astern.
At 5.50 pm (another source speaks of 5.20 pm), suddenly, the disaster occurred: the Da Noli hit a mine, raising a large column of whitish water, broke in two forward of the bridge and sank in a few seconds, about five miles west of the Pertusato lighthouse.
Commander Valdambrini, together with most of the personnel present with him on the bridge, was killed by the explosion (according to another source, however, Valdambrini was seen in the water after the sinking, wounded, but did not survive anyway); most of the crew sank with the ship, others ended up in the water or on rafts.
The mine struck by the Da Noli belonged to a barrage (which had a total of 410 mines, arranged in three rows) laid south of Capo Fenu just two weeks earlier, on 26 August, by the German minelayers Pommern and Brandenburg. Da Noli and Vivaldi had not been informed of the presence of this minefield, so Da Noli had unwittingly slipped into it in an attempt to escape the German fire, with tragic consequences.
From Vivaldi numerous shipwrecked people were sighted at sea, and shortly afterwards also a motor launch, moving near life rafts; but the Vivaldi was not in a position to help anyone, and could only communicate to Supermarina and the Squad Command (with the radio signal, powered by backup batteries, since the main radio was out of order) the news of the sinking of the Da Noli and the location of the castaways. In his report, the commander Bandiera described the end of the sectional unit as follows: «In the meantime the DA NOLI, who took part in the shooting against the units and batteries on the Corsican side, also seems to have been hit; it spreads out from the coast, overtakes me at speed towards the southwest and makes a lot of smoke. At 5.50 pm a large column of whitish water, like a mine explosion, envelops the DA NOLI which, broken in two in the center, sinks. We see a lot of people at sea and shortly after also a motor launch in motion near the life rafts. Having the main radio unused, I transmit the sinking and the position of the DA NOLI and the position and the breakdowns of the VIVALDI to Supermarina and to the Command Squad.
Later, having laboriously put a boiler back into operation, the Vivaldi headed west-southwest, to get out of range with respect to the coastal batteries, after which it took a course towards Menorca. At 7.15 pm the Vivaldi sighted in the distance the cruiser Attilio Regolo and the XII Destroyer Squadron, sailing towards the Balearic Islands with the shipwrecks of the battleship Roma, sunk a few hours earlier by German planes in the Gulf of Asinara; an exchange of signals followed with which Commander Shirt tried to ask for assistance for his ship and rescue for the survivors of the Da Noli, but, due to a series of misunderstandings and misunderstandings, he was unable to obtain either.
The destroyer Mitragliere (vessel captain Giuseppe Marini), squadron leader of the XII Squadriglia, ordered the torpedo boat Pegaso (frigate captain Riccardo Imperiali) - also sailing towards the Balearics with shipwrecked Roma, but separately - to go and rescue the Da Freight. The torpedo boat, however, was repeatedly attacked by German aircraft until late at night, and consequently ended up giving up the rescue operation: his commander, having seen the Vivaldi sailing west and not knowing that it was badly damaged, thought that the latter could have dealt with it. According to the book "The Italian warships interned in the Balearics after 8 September" by Giuliano Marenco, who in turn cites the detailed work "The armistice of 8 September 1943 and the drama of the naval battle forces" by Francesco Mattesini, the situation of the two destroyers and their need for help was at the center of a terrible misunderstanding: to ask for help, Vivaldi sent the message "I am proceeding slow motion I have great damage alt Da Noli sunk on mines", but this was only deciphered in part, so that on the Mitragliere we read instead "Proceeding slowly, I have great damage on mines", losing the central part of the message and any reference to Da Noli. As a result of this incredible misunderstanding, the commander of the Machine Gunner got the impression that it was the Vivaldi who had stumbled upon mines off Capo Fenu and that he had suffered very serious damage, while he was completely ignorant of the fate of the Da Noli. Shortly after, having spotted a destroyer towards the bow (it was the Vivaldi, damaged, but whose damage did not appear visible due to the great distance) and not knowing that the Da Noli had sunk, the commander of the machine gunner believed that it was precisely the Da Noli , and that he had remained unscathed. Consequently, the machine gunner ordered Pegaso to go and rescue the Vivaldi, instead of the Da Noli, near Capo Fenu. The torpedo boat headed for Capo Fenu, but then had to change course for safety reasons; precisely as a result of this change of course, he came across the Vivaldi, from which he intercepted some messages in which it was said that it was still capable of developing a speed of 7 knots, which would have allowed him to reach the coast; seeing the Vivaldi sailing west, the commander of the Pegaso - who did not know that the Da Noli had sunk - believed that the destroyer was able to fend for himself and, in consideration of the continuous air attacks, decided to abandon the rescue attempt. and to go back to find the rest of the team.
In the end, no one went to save the castaways of the Da Noli.
There were about ninety men of the Da Noli, some of them wounded, who had initially survived the sinking, ending up in the sea: but most of them would have died at sea. The survivors of the destroyer were very close to the coast of Corsica, but in the Strait of Bonifacio an east wind blew that away from the earth, rather than approaching them: fighting against the strong headwind, most ended up succumbing, drowning before they could reach the shore.
The first castaways to reach the coast took almost twenty-four hours to get there: they were 15 men on a lifeboat, the left one, who landed at 5pm on 10 September near the Capo Senetosa Signal Station. Among them was the second in command of the Da Noli, corvette captain Danilo Silvestri, who had recovered the 14 shipwrecked (three of them wounded) who he had managed to reach by rowing laboriously against the wind, until the darkness had precluded him. further research. These fifteen men were also the largest group of Da Noli castaways to touch land. At midnight the group was embarked on a motor sailer sent from Ajaccio, which took them to the Corsican port, where it arrived at 4.30 on 11 September, also carrying the body of a castaway (probably one of the 15 of the launch, who later died), who was buried in Ajaccio.
Other survivors, aboard life rafts, reached the Corsican coast with a thousand hardships in the following 2-3 days; a group of four castaways, on a raft, were rescued at 1pm on 11 September (for another version, on the morning of 13 September) by a Corsican fishing boat, which took them to one of the Sanguinaires Islands, from where they reached Ajaccio.
Once ashore, the lieutenant captain Silvestri urged the organization of searches by the Marine Command of Bonifacio: a rescue plane was therefore sent, but no other survivors were found. All the castaways of the Da Noli were embarked on the corvette Ibis and transferred to Porto Torres on 18 September, then continuing on to Cagliari.
In the following days the sea threw the bodies of six or seven men from Da Noli on the coasts of Corsica; other corpses, floating in the middle of the minefields, were not recovered because the mines made this task too dangerous.
On the number of deaths and survivors there are some discrepancies according to the sources, but the sad certainty is that the crew of the Da Noli almost completely perished, in the sinking of the ship or at sea during the following days.
According to the aforementioned volume of the USMM "The Navy from 8 September 1943 to the end of the conflict", at the departure from La Spezia 267 men were embarked on the Da Noli, of which only 39 survived, while 228 died, including the commander Valdambrini , 7 other officers and 22 non-commissioned officers.
A recent essay (2015) by Giuliano Manzari, "The participation of the Navy in the War of Liberation", published in the USMM Archives Bulletin, draws an even worse balance: the crew of the Da Noli would have been composed of 238 men ( 12 officers, 25 non-commissioned officers, 19 sergeants, 37 sub-chiefs and 145 sailors), of which only 18 would have survived, i.e. 4 officers, 3 non-commissioned officers, a sergeant, 5 sub-chiefs and 5 sailors, while the dead would have been 220, of which 8 officers , 22 non-commissioned officers, 18 sergeants, 32 sub-chiefs and 140 sailors.
In the list of the dead and missing of the Navy in the Second World War there are the names of 223 men of the Da Noli who died or were missing following the sinking.
Their names:
Santo Aiello, second chief mechanic, deceased
Luigi Albiero, second class torpedo leader, missing
Luigi Alboretti, gunner sailor, missing
Angelo Aliprandi, gunner sailor, missing
Carlo Altieri, radio telegraph sailor, missing
Alberto Ambrosi, gunner sergeant, missing
Ezio Angelucci, stoker sailor, missing
Armando Antonelli, SDT sailor, missing
Giannino Antoniacomi, second helmsman, missing
Duilio Antonucci, signaling sailor, missing
Raffaele Aricò, sailor gunner, missing
Luigi Arman, second-class chief mechanic, missing
Giovanni Armuzza, lieutenant, missing
Raffaele Avitaia, sailor, missing
Arturo Bagnasco, sailor, missing
Lorenzo Baiochi, mechanical sailor, missing
Giacinto Bani, mechanical sailor, missing
Costantino Bassi, gunner sergeant, missing
Fausto Bellotti, sailor, missing
Angelo Beretta, gunner sailor, missing
Ernesto Besio, stoker sailor, missing
Fernando Bevilacqua, electrician sailor, missing
Gildo Bianchi, sailor, missing
Francesco Biasco, mechanical sergeant, missing
Agostino Biggi, sailor, missing
Alide Bisaschi, gunner sailor, missing
Giuseppe Bocchino, second gunner, missing
Salvatore Brambilla, gunner sailor, missing
Salvatore Brigandi, stoker sailor, missing
Stellio Brivonese, sailor, missing
Michele Bruno, stoker sailor, missing
Salvatore Buda, sailor, missing
Leonida Burchianti, second head of SDT, missing
Angelo Buzzetto, second chief mechanic, missing
Benedetto Cabella, gunner sergeant, missing
Cirillo Caddeo, second chief engineer, missing
Fausto Calbini, sailor, missing
Giovanni Caminiti, sailor, missing
Ferdinando Cammarota, second head of SDT, missing
Giusto Campaner, mechanical deputy chief, missing
Gioacchino Cancila, sailor, missing
Italo Candiotto, gunner sergeant, missing
Antonio Capone, motor sailor, missing
Rinaldo Cappella, SDT sailor, missing
Mario Caralla, sailor, missing
Virgilio Carpani, chief gunner, missing
Biagio Casalini, stoker sailor, missing
Bruno Caslini, gunner sailor, missing
Renato Castiglia, second gunner, missing
Pietro Cavassa, sailor, missing
Luigi Cervini, gunner sailor, missing
Aldo Ciccotti, SDT sailor, missing
Eugenio Collovigh, third class chief mechanic, deceased
Nicolò Colonna, second gunner, missing
Lorenzo Conca, deputy radio telegraph operator, missing
Agostino Coratella, gunner sergeant, missing
Orlando Corbacella, deputy radio telegraph operator, missing
Salvatore Costa, sailor, missing
Carmine Crescitelli, sailor helmsman, missing
Sante Crotti, gunner sailor, missing
Antonio Cuccurullo, second gunner, missing
Aldo Curcio, stoker sailor, missing
Giuseppe Curto, gunner sergeant, deceased
Vincenzo D'Andrea, sailor, missing
Giuseppe D'Anna, gunner sailor, missing
Pasquale D'Auria, second chief quartermaster, missing
Augusto Dallou, sailor, missing
Alighiero Dante, quartermaster sergeant, missing
Antonino Dattola, gunner sailor, missing
Angelo De Fareri, mechanical deputy chief, missing
Pietro De Sario, second top scorer, missing
Arturo Debernardi, electrician sailor, missing
Francesco Dentice, radio telegraph sailor, missing
Giuseppe Di Lorenzo, signaling sailor, missing
Giovanni Di Maio, stoker sailor, missing
Bruno Di Nisio, gunner sailor, missing
Giuseppe Di Vincenzo, deputy electrician, missing
Nevio Donatelli, gunner sailor, missing
Giuseppe Donato, second chief radio operator, missing
Efisio Falchi, sailor, missing
Salvatore Farris, stoker sailor, missing
Vito Fello, aspirant of the Naval Engineers, missing
Giuseppe Ficara, second gunner, missing
Giuseppe Florio, SDT sailor, missing
Giuseppe Formica, gunner sailor, missing
Francesco Fregoni, sailor, missing
Massimo Frusteri, third class mechanic chief, missing
Emilio Galimberti, stoker deputy chief, missing
Guido Galli, deputy head of SDT, missing
Franco Gandolfo, SDT sailor, missing
Vittorio Gavagnin, electrician sailor, missing
Gian Roberto Genta, ensign, missing
Ettore Giampieri, serg. m. Naval Engineer, missing
Esterino Giannico, stoker sailor, deceased
Rocco Gioffrè, third class mechanic chief, missing
Renato Girace, second chief quartermaster, missing
Aldo Giribone, gunner sailor, missing
Giovanni Gismondi, gunner sergeant, missing
Vittorio Giuliani, second chief radio operator, missing
Angelo Gobbi, sailor, missing
Raffaele Goduto, deputy electrician, missing
Alberto Gori, sailor, missing
Rosario Grasso, sailor, missing
Adelio Grilli, signaling sailor, missing
Hannibal Guerra, stoker sailor, missing
Vincenzo Guida, sailor, missing
Silvano Guidi, second gunner, missing
Primo Gullienszich, stoker sailor, missing
Antonio Invernizzi, electrician sergeant, missing
Claudio La Rocca, signaling sailor, missing
Mario Lambri, stoker sailor, missing
Tenth Landini, sergeant, missing
Renato Lattanzi, radio telegraph sailor, missing
Romano Lazzari, second class helmsman chief, missing
Sergio Leardini, sailor, missing
Donato Lenuzza, electrician sergeant, missing
Antonino Leotta, second lieutenant of the Naval Engineers, missing
Giuseppe Libri, sailor carpenter, missing
Andrea Lieto, second gunner, missing
Brenno Ligabue, gunner sailor, missing
Antonio Lipari, ensign, deceased
Paolo Livorno, SDT Deputy Chief, missing
Calogero Lo Biondo, sailor, missing
Alberto Lombardi, motor sailor, missing
Spartaco Longoni, electrician sailor, missing
Luciano Lubrano, stoker sailor, missing
Attilio Lucchi, sailor, missing
Mario Managlia, sailor, missing
Olivo Marinari, gunner sailor, deceased
Tommaso Marolla, second top scorer, missing
Arturo Martincig, gunner sergeant, missing
Fernando Masini, gunner sailor, missing
Vito Matarese, gunner sailor, missing
Luigi Mauri, gunner sailor, missing
Antonio Mazza, torpedo sub-chief, missing
Alessandro Mazzoni, stoker sailor, missing
Raffaele Meli, gunner sailor, missing
Francesco Mellone, deputy electrician, missing
Isaia Mellone, SDT deputy chief, missing
Ettore Micheloni, sailor gunner, deceased
Eugenio Minniti, mechanical deputy chief, missing
Bruno Miori, sailor, missing
Silvestro Modesto, sailor, missing
Mario Moretti, stoker sailor, missing
Aldo Moro, pilot sergeant, missing
Cesare Morra, stoker sailor, missing
Alessandro Mozzali, torpedo sailor, missing
Antonio Navarra, sailor, missing
Nereo Nicoli, third class quartermaster, missing
Gaspare Noto, sailor, missing
Giovanni Orsucci, radio telegraph sailor, missing
Lorenzo Pagano, sailor, missing
Placido Paladino, sailor, missing
Vito Antonio Palmisano, stoker sailor, missing
Giuseppe Perdetti, gunner sailor, missing
Filippo Petruzzellis, gunner sergeant, missing
Mario Piccoli, gunner sailor, missing
Luigi Pilotti, stoker sailor, missing
Baldassare Pinetti, second gunner, missing
Giuseppe Piras, gunner sailor, missing
Mario Pischedda, stoker sailor, missing
Mario Polichetti, torpedo sailor, missing
Vittorio Poni, mechanical sergeant, missing
Giuseppe Porchera, sailor, missing
Paolo Porrino, torpedo boat sub-chief, missing
Augusto Pricca, mechanical deputy chief, missing
Salvatore Proietto, sailor helmsman, missing
Pasquale Proscia, sailor, missing
Francesco Quartuccio, SDT sailor, missing
Pietro Paolo Rabboni, first class mechanic chief, missing
Eugenio Remondino, torpedo sailor, missing
Vincenzo Renda, mechanical sailor, missing
Carmelo Repaci, sailor, missing
Felice Riboldi, sailor, missing
Angelo Riccò, sailor gunner, missing
Ortensio Riva, stoker sailor, missing
Tullio Rossi, stoker sailor, missing
Domenico Rotella, deputy head of SDT, missing
Giovanni Ruggiero, sailor, deceased
Tommaso Ruggiero, sailor, missing
Eugenio Russo, sailor, missing
Michele Russo, lieutenant of the Naval Engineers, deceased
Duilio Sabatini, stoker sailor, missing
Francesco Saccomani, radio telegraph sailor, missing
Albano Sambin, second port chief, missing
Attilio Sarzanini, sailor, missing
Romeo Savoia, stoker sailor, missing
Giuseppe Sbarbaro, sailor, missing
Angelo Scaletta, sailor, missing
Salvatore Scamardella, sailor helmsman, missing
Emilio Scardala, second chief radio operator, missing
Raffaele Scaringi, second helmsman chief, missing
Andrea Sciacqua, SDT sergeant, missing
Michele Scotto D'Abusco, sailor helmsman, missing
Sergio Sebastianutti, gunner sailor, missing
Giuseppe Secondo, sailor, missing
Antonio Sementa, second mechanical chief, missing
Ignazio Serio, stoker sailor, missing
Roberto Sibilio, mechanical sailor, missing
Pietro Silipigni, sailor, missing
Mario Simoni, second gunner, missing
Cesare Soria, nurse sergeant, missing
Giovanni Spena, second gunner, missing
Virginio Tettamanti, stoker sailor, missing
Ferruccio Tonello, SDT sailor, missing
Guido Torniai, sailor, missing
Domenico Tortora, sailor, missing
Gaetano Tregrosso, SDT sailor, missing
Rosario Trova, sailor, missing
Domenico Uggeri, gunner sailor, missing
Danilo Ughi, sub-chief quartermaster, deceased
Carmelo Vaccaro, stoker sailor, missing
Pio Valdambrini, frigate captain (commander), missing
Vincenzo Valentini, SDT sailor, missing
Renzo Vaselli, sailor helmsman, missing
Angelo Vasile, sailor, missing
Carlo Venturelli, second class chief electrician, deceased
Girolamo Verde, sailor, missing
Amos Vezzani, sailor, missing
Bruno Vianello, stoker sailor, missing
Walther Vicinelli, stoker sailor, missing
Arrigo Vigino, motor sailor, missing
Cataldo Zaccaria, stoker sailor, missing
Around 7 pm Vivaldi was able to put one of the cars back into operationboilersand, at a speed of 10 knots, tried to get away, but was again attacked by German bombers Dornier Do 217 before 20: despite the reaction of the ship's anti-aircraft artillery, abombHenschel Hs 293 radio guide struck the unit causing further damage.
After learning and almost stopped at midnight, the Vivaldi continued its increasingly difficult navigation, but at 5:30 on 10 September, after having passed the Asinara, unable to continue, the order was given to abandon the ship and scuttle it. . Two crew members, the lieutenant captain Alessandro Cavriani (squadron assistant) and the chief mechanic Virginio Fasan, returned aboard to hasten the end, but both disappeared with the ship sinking about fifty miles west of the Asinara: the gold medal for military valor was awarded to their memory.
The shipwrecked Vivaldi then went to meet a very troubled fate. A German seaplane recovered 23 survivors who were taken to Corsica; three other seaplanes, also German, landed to recover the shipwrecked, were machine-gunned, set on fire and destroyed by aairplaneAmerican (in this strafing some castaways were killed, indicated according to the sources in two or 13). At 1:30 am on September 11, a German patrol boat rescued 47 other shipwrecked people along with the crews of the destroyed planes, while a US seaplane recovered two or four others.
44 survivors of the Vivaldi and (mostly) of the Da Noli were recovered by the submarine HMS Sportsman on the evening of the 12th, while another 7 men were saved on September 16 by the MZ 780 motor raft, which took them toMahón. 89 survivors reached Spanish territory.
In all, the crew of the Vivaldi had 58 dead and 240 survivors (other sources indicate instead 90 between dead - 56 - and missing - 34 - and 190 survivors).
The wreck of the Da Noli was located by chance in 1975 by the coral maker Giovanni Spigno, from Santa Teresa di Gallura. The latter, fishing for coral in the Strait of Bonifacio with a "St. Andrew's cross", found the "cross" full of bullets and immediately informed the authorities, who a few weeks later sent the support ship Pietro Cavezzale to the place, which proceeded identification of the wreck.
Apparently, the first dive of divers on the wreck of the Da Noli took place only in September 2009; strangely, there have been reports of the destroyer "discovery" in May 2013, although its location had already been known for several years.
The Da Noli lies broken into two sections on a sandy bottom, 5.85 miles from the Corsican coast and at a depth between 93 and 108 meters.
In July 2016 a group of divers, led by Mario Arena, deposited a plaque donated by the Municipality of Noli, the birthplace of the ship's eponymous navigator, on the wreck of the destroyer. The plaque reads "In memory of the over 200 sailors who lost their lives in the fulfillment of their duty" and bears the motto of Da Noli: "Take me with you to my last fortune".
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